We examine the use (and non-use) of list price information in the process of marketing commercial real estate. While housing market research suggests that list prices can serve as a strong anchor and/or signal, list price information is included in less than one-third of the commercial property sales and is less likely to be included as part of the sellers' offering information for larger and more complex properties. Given the potentially powerful effect of list prices (first offers) on outcomes, the non-use of list price information is a puzzle. We speculate that the limited use of list prices may be due to the sellers' interests in both maintaining their informational advantage and not truncating higher than expected offers, especially during periods of economic growth or with more complex properties. Using a two-stage selection correction model, we find that office properties which provide list price information are, on average, associated with lower price outcomes (ceteris paribus) and that these outcomes vary by price cohort and economic condition. It is important to note, however, that while these findings identify a correlation, they do not necessarily imply causation. Our results support the notion that asymmetric information and information signaling play a dominant role in explaining the sellers' strategic non-use of list price information in the commercial real estate market and that the signaling effect is more pronounced in higher priced properties and during periods of strong economic growth. 
the underlying determinants of the use of list prices and (2) evaluating the relationship between the use of list price information and subsequent transaction prices. We are not aware of any previous work that has looked at these issues within the context of the commercial property market.
We report that larger, more complex, and multi-tenant properties are less likely to reveal list price information. After controlling for property-and market-specific factors, the prices of properties sold that used list prices are, on average, lower than those sold without list prices. These price differences vary by price cohort and economic condition. Our findings do not imply that list prices cause transaction prices to be lower, but that their use is correlated with lower prices. The results support the notion that sellers do not reveal list price information in order to maintain an information advantage and to avoid truncating higher than expected offers, especially during periods of growth or when marketing complex properties. In this environment, revealed list prices may be effectively used to signal additional information (e.g., seller motivations) to the market. Thus, asymmetric information and signaling are argued to play a dominant role in explaining the sellers' strategic nonuse of list price information in the commercial property market.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides context and motivation for the study. The empirical methodology adopted is discussed in Section 3. The data are described in Section 4 and the test results reported in the "Empirical Results" Section, followed by the Conclusion.
Motivation and Literature
Much like in the residential market, the marketing and sale of commercial property is often facilitated by listing brokers and agents. The commercial property broker assembles information deemed relevant to potential buyers in forming and submitting offers for purchase.
The materials assembled (e.g., an offering memorandum) typically include information on the market, the site and its location, the structure and other improvements, the tenants and their leases, comparable properties, and income and expense (pro forma) data. This information may be distributed directly to potential buyers and their advisors, or to potential buyers through the agents' network and their listing channels.
Compared to the housing market, commercial real estate tends to be marketed more directly to buyers and their advisors through the brokers' network. This effort may include placing the information on an online service such as LoopNet, 3 the Commercial Investment
Multiple Listings Service (CIMLS), COMMREX Commercial Real Estate Exchange, and/or on a private password-protected website. Sometimes, especially for Class A properties, offering memoranda are sent directly to potential buyers, advisors, and agents indicating the bid due dates. As specified in the memoranda, the offers received may be accepted, negotiated, re-bid, or rejected. 4 In all cases, the information provided may or may not specify a seller's asking price.
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Instead, some information regarding the seller's asking price may be privately conveyed during
the process by what is commonly known as a "whisper" price (e.g., "we think the property should sell between x and y" or "we believe the property should sell at a cap rate of about z").
Thus, seller list prices are most often not openly revealed when transacting commercial property.
This approach is puzzling, because related research in the housing literature indicates that list prices may be strategically used to market the property. In looking at the housing market, Bucchianeri and Minson (2012) report that "the commonly recommended practice of underpricing in fact relates to less favorable outcomes... [and that] relatively high listing prices lead to higher sale prices." Specifically, list prices may serve as a price "anchor" and influence buyer perceptions of value.
The experimental research literature has looked at the effect of judgmental heuristics, the mental shortcuts or rules-of-thumb used by individuals in making decisions which may lead to inaccurate or biased conclusions. One heuristic identified is "anchoring" (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) . In anchoring, an individual's estimate is unduly influenced by a reference value (i.e., anchor) where the adjustments from the reference are underweighted resulting in bias. Evidence of anchoring behavior has been found in a wide variety of conditions, including even when the anchor is unrealistic (Strack and Mussweiler 1997) and when the decision makers are warned (Wilson and Houston 1996) . Particularly robust evidence of anchoring has been found in consumer behavior. Ariely et al. (2003) , for example, find that the values placed on familiar products are strongly influenced by arbitrary anchors. 6 Perhaps most relevant to this study, Northcraft and Neale (1987) indicate that when asked to value a single-family home, real estate agents (experts) were influenced by its list price (the reference anchor). Agents were provided an information packet and each asked to value the same home. All agents received identical information packets, except for the asking price of the subject property. Although most claimed the asking price was not relevant information, the agents' subsequent estimates of value were found to be positively correlated with the asking price. Scott and Lizieri (2012) also find that individuals rely on anchors when estimating property values, even in the presence of significant incentives for accurate judgment, and that this influence can affect subsequent estimates. Consistent with an anchoring effect of the list prices, Black and Diaz (1996) report that in a controlled lab experiment both the buyers' opening offers and the eventual outcomes were positively correlated with manipulated list prices. They report that even when the manipulated list price is incongruous, negotiators may anchor on list price and devalue complex property-and market-specific information. 7 Finally, list prices may be viewed as first offers which have been shown to have powerful effects on outcomes (e.g., Van
Poucke and Buelens (2002), Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) Kamis et al. (2004) find that final bids are influenced by the seller reference prices (reserve price) in their experimental research evaluating auction processes. 8 Additionally, bargaining outcomes may be influenced by the use of intermediaries (e.g., agents), their reputations and their incentives (see, for example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ; Bazerman et al. (1992) ; Croson and Mnookin (1997) and Yavas et al. (2001) ).
prices of commercial properties. Ling et al. (2012) examine the potential effects of search costs and anchoring on transaction prices of commercial properties. They find little evidence that distant buyers and sellers anchor reservation prices on values in their local (home) markets.
However, Bokhari and Geltner (2011) in a study focused on risk aversion, report a large anchoring or signaling effect (they cannot distinguish the type) associated with the overpricing of commercial property. Moreover, they find this effect is larger for more experienced or sophisticated investors. To the degree that this outcome can be attributed to anchoring, and not signaling, it challenges the notion that experts are less influenced by the anchoring heuristic.
A second possible explanation is that uncertain and asymmetric information may affect the propensity of making the first offer in a negotiation process (Oesch and Galinsky (2011) ). In a commercial property sale, the seller typically holds more information than the buyer. Because of this, buyer offers span a larger range of possible values. By not disclosing a list price, the seller does not truncate the distribution of possible offers and is able to take advantage of those that might be higher than expected. If buyers happen to be aggressive they may exceed sellers' expectations and money is not "left on the table," consistent with the notion of "not tipping your hand." In this case, we would expect to see the use of list prices correlated with information certainty and the distribution of possible offers.
Alternatively, list price information may serve as an effective guide (and anchor) when the expected cash flows reflected in the pro forma are more uncertain, as with complex multitenant or low occupancy properties. 9 In this case, we would expect to see list prices associated more with larger, more complex properties (i.e., information uncertainty) and less so with smaller single tenant properties.
Third, the use (and non-use) of list prices may serve as a signal to potential buyers. List prices, when used, may convey (i.e., signal) information about the quality or type of the property to specific buyers, or about the willingness of the seller to negotiate. For example, a particularly low list price on a property may imply the seller is highly motivated and willing to negotiate, or that atypical property features exist (e.g., deferred maintenance, unusually low occupancy rates, or a number of other factors).
Or, finally, some combination of these explanations is possible. For example, the use of a "whisper price" may be viewed as a combination approach. It allows the seller to gage buyer response and solicit potential offer information, with the option of providing an anchor.
Interestingly, Valley et al. (1992) , studying the impact of information shared with third-party real estate agents in the housing market, discovered that transaction prices are higher when buyer reservation prices are shared with agents and lower when agents know only seller reservation prices.
Methodology
To evaluate the use and effect of list prices in commercial property transactions, we first examine the determinants of the likelihood of the seller using a list price when marketing the property, and then examine the effect of the list price on the sale price.
The Likelihood of Using a List Price
The likelihood of a list price being used when marketing the property is assumed to be a function of property characteristics, market characteristics, and sale conditions (i.e., seller, buyer, and sale conditions). The probability of using a list price can be estimated as a probit model, and specified as
where = 1 if property j uses a listing price, 0 otherwise and Z is a vector of market, property, and sale condition variables at time t. Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution, the estimated coefficient, and the estimation error. � � produces a probit score, or index, that is used to evaluate the marginal effect and statistical significance of each variable on the likelihood of including a list price as part of the offering.
Our hypothesis is that larger, more complex, property transactions are less likely to use listing prices in the transaction process. In complex transactions, the potential distribution of buyer offers may be wider, especially during times of strong economic growth. Because sellers retain the right to reject all offers, they may be less inclined to provide list price information (and reservation price information) that could truncate possible offers. In less complex smaller property transactions, where the potential distribution of offers is narrower, sellers are more likely to publish list price information in an effort to strategically "anchor" the potential offers, or to signal to prospective buyers their willingness to negotiate and (in the case of a unusually low listing price) sell at a "bargain."
The Relationship between Using a List Price and the Transaction Price
We next examine the effect of a list price on sale price using a standard hedonic regression, specified as If list prices primarily serve as a "signal" to commercial property buyers of the sellers' willingness to negotiate the property sale, the estimated coefficient on LIST is expected to be negative. Alternatively, if commercial property list prices primarily (and effectively) serve as a strategic pricing "anchor," we would expect the estimated coefficient, c, to be positive. Of course, it is possible (and likely) that use of list price information is a combination of the two tactics. The influence of list price information on transaction outcomes will therefore depend on which effect dominates.
A Selection-Corrected Model-The Decision to List and the Transaction Price
Because a property's transaction price, , is likely to be affected by many of the same factors influencing the likelihood of using a list price in marketing the property, we estimate a two-stage model and examine alternate interactive specifications. We are interested in the estimated coefficient, , on ; however, estimates of the OLS regression (2) may be subject to selection bias.
In the standard selection bias problem, information on the dependent variable for part of the sample is missing (or cannot be determined). In a second type of selection bias problem, dependent variable information is not missing, but its distribution is selective. In our case, the decision of sellers to use list price information may be selective. If we estimate an OLS regression with as dependent variable and a dummy variable indicating whether or not a list price is used, we may get a biased estimate on the correlation of using list price information because the distribution of transaction prices over the categories of properties using list prices ( = 1) and properties not using list prices ( = 0), are not random. That is, properties marketed with list prices may simply be different from those that do not use list prices. If these omitted characteristics are related to price, the estimated coefficient on may capture these effects and be biased.
To correct for this potential bias we adopt the Heckman selection correction procedure.
The first step of the procedure is to estimate the probit regression (1) and then to include the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) created from the probit results as an independent variable in the second stage hedonic price Eq. (2), such that:
Heckman ( 1979) shows that that the inclusion of IMR corrects for the bias of the coefficient estimates. We note that the standard errors of the coefficient are also biased and additional corrections are required.
Data
The data used in this study come from the CoStar group, a Washington D.C. period. This 6-year period spans a range of market conditions, including a period of especially strong growth followed by a rapid decline and then a slight increase in U.S. commercial real estate market transaction activity. This allows us to examine our hypotheses under varying economic conditions.
The data were restricted to single office buildings greater than 2,000 square feet; located on sites less than 25 acres; sold for $100,000 to $500 million (with assessed values greater than $1,000); and less than 100 years of age at their time of sale. This initial filter resulted in a set of 33,022 observations. Effort was taken to include all viable building transactions; however, 9,893 sale observations identified as being sold as part of a more complex transaction (e.g., portfolio
and multi-property sales, land sales, build-to-suit, non-arm's length sales associated with development or expansions) and 3,506 other atypical sales were excluded. The observation variables are defined in Table 1 and their descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 . Summary statistics (i.e., mean, median, min., max., and std. dev.) are reported for 10 The atypical sales such as 1031 tax-deferred exchanges, tenant purchases, distressed sales, sale lease-backs, or property shell sales, which are coded by CoStar as "detrimental condition" sales, represented approximately 7.7 % of the sales initially identified. Readers may be interested in noting that these observations were included in an earlier version of the paper. Their inclusion did not materially change the general results reported here when control variables were included in model estimates. 11 CoStar identifies 354 broker-defined office submarkets having transaction activity within the 24 metro-politan areas examined. The number of the submarkets in the metropolitan areas varies from two in Inland-Empire (California) to 39 in South Florida. Over 30 % of the submarkets reported less than 10 transactions during the study period. To maintain transaction activity within the submarkets and across the periods, submarkets with less than 25 transactions were identified and grouped with a larger submarket. Submarkets were grouped using the following criteria: (1) they were adjacent to each other; (2) their transaction prices per square foot were similar; and (3) they were located at similar distances from the metropolitan area's central business district. This process resulted in the identification of 238 submarkets. As shown in Table 3 , the percentage of properties marketed with a stated list price varies from a high of 38.5 % for properties $100,000 to $1 million, to a low of 3.2 % for properties in the $50 million to $100 million range. In general, higher priced properties were much less likely to be marketed with a formal listing price.
Empirical Results

Probit Model Estimates
The estimates of the probit model (Eq. 1) are reported in Table 4 . Three general factors are examined: the characteristics of the structure, economic conditions, and conditions within the local market. To evaluate the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients, alternative specifications are estimated and the results for two specifications are reported. Model 4.1 includes the structural characteristics of the property (i.e., SQFT, AGE, PSFG, CL-A, MULT, and COND) and the year dummies as fixed effects in the specification. SQFT and AGE control for differences in property size (square feet) and age (years), while PSFG (sale price per square foot specified as a categorical variable), 12 CL-A (Class A property) and COND (poor quality of building condition) control for variations in property quality, and MULT is included to capture the variation in cash flow projection complexities associated with multiple-versus single-tenant properties. Each of the estimated coefficients has the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 1 % level, with the exception of MULT which is significant at the 5 % level and COND (p = 0.116). The results indicate that, on average, listing price information is less likely to be used on larger, newer, higher-quality, multi-tenant properties. This is consistent with the idea that the sellers of larger, more complex, income-producing office properties (with complex lease structures and 12 Construction quality is included in the probit model as a factor related to the use of a listing price. Price per square foot, PSF, can serve as a proxy for construction quality. However, including PSF in the first stage probit estimates of two-stage selection correction models (presented in "Selection-Corrected Model Estimates") when the second stage includes both SQFT and lnSP causes potential problems with convergence the estimation results. To avoid this, price per square foot is specified as a categorical variable, PSFG, with values ranging from 1 to 12 (low to high) in all of the models estimated. PSFG is constructed to include approximately an equal number of observations in each category.
varying cash flow expectations) do not reveal list price information in order to maintain an information advantage and not constrain potential buyer offers.
The likelihood of using list price information is found to vary by year and by market.
Observations sold in YR11 are omitted and the estimates evaluated relative to that year. Table 4 are not significantly different (statistically) from those reported in model 4.1 in Table 4. 14 The marginal effects estimates for model specification 4.2 are also reported in right-hand column of Table 4 . The estimated coefficient in the probit model represents the change in the probit index resulting from a one-unit increase in the independent variable. The marginal effects reported in the last column of Table 4 indicate the change in the probability of using list price information associated with a one-unit change in the independent variables, if dichotomous, and 13 Inland Empire, commonly defined as the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario MSA, is located east of the Los Angeles MSA. 14 The set of independent variables available for 4.1 and 4.2 are limited and additional property and seller characteristics (observed and unobserved) are likely to be important. To explore the potential significance of omitted property variables, unrelated to the time of sale, a subset of properties that sold twice is identified (1,849 obs.) and Model 4.2 re-estimated to include the variable (LIST1), where LIST1 is 1 if a listing price was used on the property's previous sale, else 0. The estimated coefficient on LIST1 is not significantly different from zero at the 10 % level (β = 0.149; t = 1.61). This reinforces the explanatory strength of the limited set of factors included in 4.2. However, additional work is needed to investigate the role of the seller, broker, and other potentially important time varying characteristics on the use of list prices.
a one standard deviation change in the independent variable evaluated at its mean value, if nondichotomous. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in the size of the structure (SQFT) is correlated with a 13.3 % decline in the probably of using a stated list price in marketing the property (or an increase of 79,890 square feet infers a 13.3 % decline in the probability).
Similarly, a one standard deviation increase (25.4 years) in the property's age increases the probability by approximately than 1.2 %. The quality and complexity of the property are important factors in determining the probability of using a list price. For example, a one-unit increase in PSF category and the marketing of Class A (CL-A) and multi-tenant (MULT)
properties decreases the likelihood by 0.6 %, 12.7 % and 1.3 %, respectively. Properties sold as coded in poor condition (COND) are 5.7 % more likely to be sold using a list price. Finally, properties sold in 2006 during the real estate boom, controlling for structural and local market factors, were approximately one-third less likely to be marketed using a list price than in the other years of the study.
OLS Regression Estimates
To examine the correlation that providing seller list price information has (if any) with transaction prices, we first estimate a standard hedonic regression. This will be used as a benchmark to compare to the alternative two-stage selection-corrected estimates presented in "Selection-Corrected Model Estimates". Table 5 reports the OLS estimation results from Eq. (2) where structure, sale year and market factors are regressed on the natural logarithm of sale price, lnSP. 15 The results from alternative models are presented to examine the sensitivity of the 15 This model specification pools the observations in estimating the factor coefficients and in doing so it implicitly assumes that the estimated coefficient on each variable is constant across each of the other model factors (i.e., varying structure characteristics, time and markets). This is an important limitation of the model. Unfortunately, sufficient data are not available to reliably estimate cross-sectional results across each of the 24 markets for each standards of commercial properties coupled with more frequent renovations. 17 Finally, the estimated coefficients on the Class A property (CL-A) and multi-tenant property (MULT) dummies indicate these properties are transacted, on average, at prices 31.8 % and 22.9 % greater than other properties of similar size and age. This is likely due to their higher-quality and site-specific location characteristics. Properties identified as "poor" quality (COND) sold, on average, at prices 20.2 % less than similar properties, holding constant the other factors identified.
The estimated coefficients on the year dummies in 5.1 are evaluated relative to 2011, the omitted year. It is interesting to note that these coefficient estimates suggest market price movements similar to independent commercial property price index measures (e.g., Of particular interest is the estimated coefficient on LIST. The estimated coefficient, c, is found to be negative and significant. Controlling for property, time, and market differences,
properties that reveal list price information sold, on average, at prices 9.8 % less than properties marketed without list price information. This correlation is not interpreted as causal. To the degree that we are able to control for property quality in this model, this relationship suggests that list price information may serve more to "signal" to buyers specific sale conditions and the sellers' willingness to negotiate, and serve less as a behavior pricing "anchor" within the 17 In a meta analysis that looks at hedonic house price estimates, Sirmans et al. (2006) report that the estimated coefficient on age is −8.9 % for housing and that it can vary by as much as 1. LIST associated with year t. In this specification, the estimated coefficients of LIST and LIST*YRt are considered jointly to interpret the relationship between the use of a list price and the selling price of the property. The coefficients on LIST and LIST*YRt reported for 5.2 in Table   5 indicate that properties using list prices sold, on average, at prices 9.1 % (i.e., −17.9 % + 8.8 %)
to 13.3 % (i.e., −17.9 % + 4.6 %) less than properties marketed without list prices in all years except 2009. In 2009, the trough of the Great Recession, the coefficient on the cross product LIST*YR09 is estimated to be 0.243 (p < 0.01) resulting in an estimated combined effect of +6.4 %. However, because the standard error of the interacted coefficient LIST*YR09 is 0.042, the combined effect is not statistically different from zero. This suggests that during an especially weak economic period, such as 2009, the use of list prices is associated with substantially less of a sale price decrease (i.e., the "signaling" effect is weakened).
Coefficient estimates using an alternate hedonic specification (Models 5.3 and 5.4) are also reported in Table 5 . In this specification, the property characteristic variables discussed are replaced by estimates of the property's assessed value (AV) from the year prior to its sale. This specification assumes that the assessed values capture the "true" value variations of the 19 Unfortunately, because commercial properties are often marketed directly to buyers and their advisors through the brokers' network (sometimes using a bid request process), reliable time-on-market (TOM) information is not available. We suspect that the signaling is likely correlated (negatively) with TOM, but we are not able to control for this factor. In addition, information regarding specific lease terms and property occupancy rates in the dataset is not consistently reported. Observations with very low occupancy rates, if reported, have not been included in the analysis.
properties. Because income property values are a function of income expectations and return requirements (information which is generally not publicly available), hedonic specifications using solely physical characteristics may not adequately explain income property values.
Assessed values, often constructed using owner-provided property-specific income information and derived market discount rates, are likely to represent a valid explanatory variable for explaining income property values. Clapp and Giaccotto (1992) and Gatzlaff and Holmes (2012) . To be representative, appraised values do not need to be reported at the property's full (100 %) market value. The effects from the differences in market conventions (e.g., proportional values schemes) can controlled by including market area dummies within the regression model. However, the values within each market are assumed to be vertically and horizontally efficient. 
Selection-Corrected Model Estimates
Given the results of the probit model (Table 4) While the estimated coefficients on the year dummies change, which is to be expected if the use 21 The standard errors in the selection corrected model are adjusted and corrected t-stats reported.
of LIST varies by year, the differences between the coefficients for each subsequent year dummy (the annual appreciation rates) do not substantially change. Thus, the annual price movements reflected by the coefficients of the annual dummies are similar to those reported in the previous section. Finally, the estimated coefficients on market dummies are not substantially affected.
Again, as in 5.1, the estimated coefficients of the market dummies reflect both the price and the assessed value variations across the markets.
Of particular interest is the estimated coefficient on LIST. price is found to be magnified and the combined effect, −17.9 %, statistically different from zero.
The estimated coefficient on the LIST related variables are consistent with the idea that stated list prices serve as a signal associated with lower sale prices and the effect is found to dominate possible list price anchoring effects. 22 Furthermore, the "signaling effect" (i.e., the sellers' ability to convey property and/or seller information through list prices) increases during periods of strong economic growth and decreases during periods of economic weakness. interacted time dummy, this hints at the possibility of a dominant positive anchoring effect for some types of properties, especially during periods of economic weakness. Of course, the linear 22 We should mention that alternative model specifications that included time-on-market information were estimated with very little change in the coefficients of interest. The availability of the time-on-market data is quite limited and its reliability questionable; hence, it has not been reported. 23 Viewing the use of list prices, very broadly, as related to the use of reserves in auctions, these results are consistent with work in the auction literature. For example, Gan (2012) indicates that loss averse sellers will choose to set reserve prices (e.g., motivated sellers will choose to reveal list prices), and more sellers will prefer auctions without reserves when the market is hot (e.g., revealed list prices in a strong market provide clearer signals).
extrapolation of the estimated coefficients over such a wide value range is problematic.
Therefore, the models are estimated by price cohort in the next section.
Model Estimates by Price Cohort and Select Markets
In "Selection-Corrected Model Estimates" we report that the magnitude of the list price signaling effect varies by price cohort. In this section we briefly examine the effect separately by price cohort and for select markets. We first look at two price cohorts: (1) properties transacted at prices between $100,000 and $10 million, and (2) properties transacted at prices between $10 million and $500 million. 24 Selection-correction models specified identical to Models 6.1 and 6.2 are estimated for each cohort and their results reported in Table 7 . The estimation results for the lower-priced tier are reported in Models 7.1 and 7.2. In both cases, the estimated coefficient on LIST is substantially less than (<50 %) the identical model estimated using the entire pooled The coefficient on LIST estimated using the higher-priced cohort ($10 million to $500 million) and the standard OLS model (Model 7.3) is −0.147. Estimates using a selection 24 The price cohorts are selected to generally represent the non-institutional ($100,000-$10 million) and institution ($10 million to $500 million) categories. To mitigate estimation bias segmenting the data by assessed value was evaluated. However, because assessed values as a percentage of their market values vary substantially by location, this was not employed. Other alternatives were considered but segmentation by the approximate non-institutional and institutional price cohorts was determined to be most meaningful to the reader.
correction model do not converge and could not be reported. However, based on the previous results reported, it is reasonable to suggest that the OLS estimate represents the upper bound of the coefficient estimate on LIST. Thus, consistent with earlier results, the signaling effect is found to differ by price cohort, by economic period and consistently dominates a possible anchoring effect.
Finally, we estimate model specifications 6.1 and 6.2 using data from each of the "gateway" markets to document the variation in the estimated coefficients on LIST across select markets. 25 The estimation results are reported in Table 8 . Panel A of Table 8 This may suggest the signal of marketing a property using a list price is "clearer" during strong economic conditions. In addition, it should be noted that the time-varying signaling effects within the city-specific measures are charted and while measured with considerable error the estimated coefficients tend to follow a pattern similar to the pooled sample.
Conclusion
This study examines the use (and non-use) of list price information in the process of marketing income-producing office properties. While previous studies suggest that list prices in the housing market transaction process can serve as anchors and/or as signals, list prices are not generally stated as part of the standard commercial property listing. Given the powerful effect of first offers on outcomes, the non-use of list price information is a puzzle.
Our results indicate that list prices are less likely to be used when the transactions involve more complex properties with greater information asymmetries such as larger, multi-tenant, institutional-grade properties. We speculate that the limited use of list prices may be due to the sellers' interests in both maintaining their informational advantage and not truncating higher than expected offers, especially during periods of economic growth or with more complex properties.
Using a two-stage selection correction model, we find that commercial office properties that are marketed using list price information are, on average, associated with lower transaction prices. It is important to note, however, that this correlation does not imply causation. Rather, the finding is consistent with the notion that sellers use list price information to signal specific property sale conditions (e.g., tenant quality, lease terms) and/or a willingness (or unwillingness)
to negotiate a rapid sale. Consistent with this, we find the signaling effect to be more pronounced for higher priced properties and less pronounced during times of weak economic growth. Our results indicate that the strategic use (and non-use) of list prices to signal seller motivations appears to dominate possible price anchoring effects that may accompany the use of revealed list prices in the transaction process.
This study represents one of the first studies to examine the use list prices in marketing commercial real estate. Additional work that looks at the factors influencing the decision to use list prices is important to resolving the question of the effect of list prices on outcomes. This table reports the Heckman selection-correction regression results to examine the correlation that providing seller list price information has with commercial real estate transaction prices. The dependent variable is logarithm of sale price. The selection-corrected model uses the probit specification from Model 4.2 to estimate the first stage (not reported) and construct the inverse Mill's ratio (IMR). The independent variables include the property assessed value, sale year, and market factors. The definitions of the independent variables are listed in Table 1 . The t-values, based on hetroskedastic consistent errors, are reported in parentheses. The ***, **, and * denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1 respectively. Table 6 , Model 6.2.
